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RECENT CASES NOTED
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS-
DUTY OF THE STATE TO FURNISH EQUAL EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES
TO NEGROES.-Lloyd Gaines, a negro citizen of Missouri, was denied
admission to the Law School of the University of Missouri, a public
institution, solely on the ground of his color. Petitioner sued out a
writ of mandamus to compel the curators of the University to admit
him. Held, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri denying
the mandamus, reversed. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 59 Sup.
Ct. 232 (1938). Although a state is under no obligation to provide
a law school education or any sort of education for its citizens, if
it does so undertake, it must afford its citizens equal rights thereto,
regardless of race, creed or color. (Gong Lurn v. Rice, 275 U. S.
78, 48 Sup. Ct. 91 (1927); Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36 (1874)).
Whether a statutory provision, as appeared herein, providing for the
establishment of "scholarships" for negroes whereby they may pro-
cure their education in out-of-state universities was a denial of the
equal protection of the laws, was left open in the case of Pearson
v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 Atl. 590 (1936). The instant case
decided the question in the affirmative.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IMMUNITY OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
FROM STATE TAXATION.-The question involved is the constitution-
ality of the New York State income tax as applied to the income of
a federal employee. The New York courts held such tax an uncon-
stitutional burden upon the functions of the Federal Government on
the authority of Rogers v. Graves, 299 U. S. 401, 57 Sup. Ct. 269
(1937) which case held that New York could not tax the income
of an employee of the Panama Railroad Company, wholly owned by
the United States. On certiorari, held, reversed. (Butler and Mc-
Reynolds, JJ., dissenting.) The immunity is not one to be implied
from the Constitution because, if allowed, it would impose an un-
lawful restriction on the taxing power which the Constitution has
reserved to state governments. New York ex rel. O'Keefe v. Graves
(Reported in N. Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1939).
By the instant decision the Supreme Court has directly reversed
all those prior cases which held that such taxation imposed an uncon-
stitutional burden on the Federal Government. These overruled cases
(Rogers v. Graves, supra, Dobbins v. Commissioners, 16 Pet. 435
(U. S. 1842), were based on the erroneous conception that the im-
munity of a government or its instrumentality (McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819)) extends to the salaries of its offi-
cers and employees. The extensions of such immunity (see Gillespie
v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501, 42 Sup Ct. 171 (1922) where it was
held that income derived by a lessee from lands leased to him by the
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government was exempt from state taxation) were halted by the
cases of Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 46 Sup. Ct. 172
(1926), James v. Dravo Co., 302 U. S. 134, 58 Sup. Ct. 208 (1937),
and Helvering v. Producers Corp., 303 U. S. 376, 58 Sup. Ct. 623
(1937). In the last case cited, the court held that the implied im-
munity, as a principle of constitutional construction, should be nar-
rowly restricted inasmuch as such immunity tended to restrict the
sovereign power of the state to tax. In its re-examination of the
question involved in the instant case, the court found that such a tax
did not interfere with the functions of the Federal Government, and
since such was the supposed reason for the rule allowing immunity,
the rule must fall.
In strong dicta appearing throughout the opinion of Justice Stone,
speaking for the majority, and in the concurring opinion of justice
Frankfurter, the Court intimates that a federal income tax on the
salaries of state employees would likewise be upheld. In this event
the leading case of Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (U. S. 1870),
would be overruled.
CORPORATIONS-RIGHT TO APPEAR IN PERsON.-Plaintiff corpo-
ration prosecuted an action against defendant and signed the summons
in its corporate name. Defendant appeared specially to set aside the
summons on the ground that such action constituted an unlawful
practice of law. Held, defendant's motion denied. The corporation
is a "person" under Section 37 of the General Construction Law and
since a person may prosecute and defend an action in his own name
(O'Brien v. Lasher, 206 App. Div. 623 (2d Dept. 1923)) the cor-
poration is likewise so authorized. Victor & Co. v. Sleininger, 255
App. Div. 673, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 323 (4th Dept. 1939). Prior to
this decision the weight of authority in this state and elsewhere was
that a corporation could not appear in person (Osborn v. Bank, 9
Wheat. 738 (U. S. 1824), Brandstein v. White Lamps, Inc., 20 F.
Supp. 369 (S. D. N. Y. 1937), Mortgage Commission v. Great Neck
Improvement Co., 162 Misc. 416, 295 N. Y. Supp. 107 (1937),
Bindery v. Eastern States Co., 166 Misc. 904, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 419
(1938), Whalen v. Pritzert, 167 Misc. 471, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 418
(1937)). The court in the instant case disregards all those vital
arguments against permitting a corporation to sue in its own name
(see (1937) 12 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 148) and holds that Section 236
of the N. Y. Civil Practice Act ("A party who is of full age may
prosecute or defend a civil action in person * * * unless he has been
judicially declared to be incompetent * * *.") and gives the corpora-
tion the same rights that a natural person has. The decision is based
in part upon the fact that Section 280 of the N. Y. Penal Law makes
it "unlawful for any corporation * * * to practice or appear as an
attorney-at-law for any person other than itself' which leaves the in-
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ference that it is legal for a corporation to act as attorney for itself.
But it is submitted that Section 4 of Article 10 of the State Consti-
tution giving corporations the right to sue and be sued cannot be
extended logically to give them the right to appear in person. Sec-
tion 236 of the Civil Practice Act applies only to natural persons
because only they can be "of full age" or be declared "incompetent".
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS-EFFECT OF GRANTING PROVISIONAL
REMEDY.-Action by the receiver of the First National Bank of De-
troit to compel defendant, a stockholder, to pay an assessment levied
pursuant to statutory liability. Under the three-year period of limi-
tation assumed by the court (plaintiff contended it was six years
because the action is based on an implied contract to pay assessments;
see Barbour v. Thomas,- 86 F. (2d) 510 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936)) the
statute would have barred the action on May 16, 1936. On May 13,
1936, the plaintiff procured a writ of attachment; service by publica-
tion on the non-resident defendant was authorized on May 22, 1936,
and completed on July 9, 1936 (N. Y. RULES OF CIV. PRAc. 51).
Defendant argues that no action was "commenced" until service of
the summons by publication was "complete". Held, the granting of
the provisional remedy on May 13, 1936 gave the court jurisdiction
over the action. Schram v. Keane, 279 N. Y. 227, 18 N. E. (2d)
136 (1938). The jurisdiction so acquired by the court is conditional
and liable to be divested (N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 825) unless per-
sonal service is thereafter-made within thirty days or service by pub-
lication is commenced within the same period (N. Y. CIv. PRAc. ACT
§ 905). Where there is a failure to comply with the condition, the
action falls; where there is compliance, the granting of the provi-
sional remedy marks the commencement of the action. Herein ser-
vice by publication was commenced in time and completed according
to Section 51 of the Rules 6f Civil Practice. Although the court
states that there is no authoritative decision upon the question in this
state, the cases of Import Chemical Co. v. Foster, 172 App. Div. 406,
158 N. Y. Supp. 409 (1st Dept. 1916), and Logan v. Greenwich
Trust Co., 144 App. Div. 372, 129 N. Y. Supp. 577 (1st Dept. 1911),
aff'd, 203 N. Y. 611, 96 N. E. 1120 (1911) directly touched upon the
point and held that an action is commenced by the granting of a
provisional remedy.
TORTS-CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN JOINT TORT-FEASORS-§211-a
OF CIVIL PRACTICE AcT.-Plaintiff was injured by a flower pot which
fell off a party wall jointly maintained by defendant-owners. Parcel
1 was owned by A and B; parcel 2 was owned by C. Judgment was
rendered against all three, and was paid by A. A brought this ac-
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tion against C to recover one-half the judgment. C contended that
since Section 211-a of the N. Y. Civil Practice Act provides for con-
tribution in pro rata shares, his share of the damages should only be
one-third. Held, judgment for one-half the amount paid by A.
Wold v. Grozalsky, 277 N. Y. 364, 14 N. E. (2d) 437 (1938).
Although it is true that the pro rata share is determined by dividing
the amount by the number of persons involved in the action, such
method of determination is employed only where the act involved is
an active one-thus, where negligence is involved, it must be active
negligence. Herein, the only reason why the action was brought
against three defendants was because one of the houses was owned
by two persons. There is a clear distinction between a direct par-
ticipation in a wrong, and a participation because of one's ownership
of property. In the latter case the negligence is merely passive in
nature. This distinction was recognized in Martindale v. Griffin, 233
App. Div. 510, 253 N. Y. Supp. 578 (4th Dept. 1931) where it was
held that although a judgment in an action for negligence was ren-
dered against three defendants, two (the owner and the driver of a
car) were liable only for one-half the judgment. To apply the method
of division urged by C would be to work an injustice and to disregard
the fact that the rule allowing contribution is founded upon principles
of natural justice and equity.
TORTS-LIABILITY OF UNEMANCIPATED CHILDREN-PUBLIC
PoLxcy.-Plaintiff brought an action against defendant, his sister,
for personal injuries sustained because of her negligent operation
of an automobile owned by her father. Both children are un-
emancipated and live with their parents. Defendant contends that
the action is not maintainable on the ground of public policy, since
it would tend to disrupt the family relationship. A further defense
interposed by the insurance company was that to permit such ac-
tions would be to encourage fraud. On appeal from a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff, held, affirmed. The maintenance of such an
action is neither forbidden by public policy nor by statutes. Rozell
v. Rozell, 256 App. Div. 61, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 901 (3d Dept. 1939).
Accord: Munsert v. Farmers Mutual Ins. Co., 281 N. W. 671 (Wis.
1938).
Although it is well settled that an unemancipated infant cannot
sue his parent for an unintentional tort (Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248
N. Y. 626, 162 N. E. 55 (1928)) such disability does not attach in
a suit against his unemancipated infant sister. In such a case, culpa-
bility is not distinguishable from liability. (Cf. Shubert v. Shubert,
249 N. Y. 253, 164 N. E. 42 (1928)). The recent amending of
Section 57 of the N. Y. Domestic Relations Law by Laws of 1937,
c. 669, which permits personal tort actions betveen spouses, indicates
1939]
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a legislative policy and intent to reverse the common law rule dis-
allowing tort actions among members of one family. The court makes.
the further point that the reason for the common law rule disallowing
such actions does not exist in the instant case inasmuch as the in-
surance company is the defendant. It is submitted, however, that
the argument made by the court concerning the insurance company
is a superficial one; future holdings will probably be the same whether
or not an insurance company is involved.
